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Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of 
market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-
known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or 
necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling 
makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds 
made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design 
title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for 
detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine 
the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes 
facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are 
supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence 
from the European and USA markets.   
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Participation by different kinds of lawyers is required to contract real estate in many 
countries. In others, including 16 states in the USA, lawyers or licensed conveyancers are the 
only professionals who can help parties to write contracts for sale, transfer deeds or both. 
Notaries enjoy an even wider reserved practice in most of Europe, with the general exceptions of 
Ireland, the UK and Scandinavia and particular exceptions for different transactions in most 
other countries. Their monopoly as a profession is grounded on the legal requirement of prior 
notarization for filing many documents in public registers and on the privileges enjoyed by 
notarized deeds in some judicial procedures;1 and it is protected by a full set of restrictions, 
including a fixed number of notaries, fixed prices and prohibitions on advertising and 
organization of notary offices.2  
Various international initiatives have pointed out that such mandatory intervention by civil 
law notaries is inefficient. In its first Doing Business report, the World Bank suggested that 
notaries are one of the main culprits for the greater cost and longer duration of company 
incorporations in civil law countries (2004, pp. 26-27). Together with pharmacies, notaries also 
figured prominently as the most regulated profession in the study commissioned by the European 
                                                 
1 The traditional source of notaries’ monopoly power was the privileged evidentiary status that 
law and courts often concede to notarized documents. This procedural difference is valuable for 
parties to enhance the enforceability of contracts (e.g., mortgage foreclosure), especially in 
countries with slow courts and whatever the substantive evidentiary value which is in fact added 
or not by notarization. However, most notarized documents are now filed in land and 
commercial registers, for which notarized documents are also required. Privileged access to 
public registers has therefore become the main source of notaries’ monopoly power to the extent 
that courts rely on the information in the registers.   
2 In addition to regulatory monopoly, the market for conveyancing services is prone to suffer 
from substantial cognitive failure on the part of customers because they purchase conveyancing 
services jointly with a very costly purchase. According to prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1985), this may cause a cognitive bias, as the cost of conveyancing is only a small loss 
integrated into a much greater loss. Furthermore, the addition of a relatively small amount to the 
huge cost of most real estate transactions could make such small amounts difficult to perceive 
(Thaler, 1980).   
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Union Competition DG on the liberalization of professions (Paterson, Fink, and Ogus, 2003, pp. 
51-57; Monti, 2003, p. 2; Commission of the European Communities, 2005).  
Both of these initiatives make a good case but also forget two key points. By focusing on 
notaries, Doing Business disregards the fact that something similar can be argued about lawyers 
where their intervention is still de iure or de facto mandatory. Furthermore, as we will see, the 
function of notaries in some civil law countries is now increasingly similar to that of notaries in 
common law, in that they often act as mere authenticators.3  
By paying insufficient attention to the nature of the service in question, the EU risks 
advancing incomplete reforms that might be inconsistent with the functions that professionals are 
entrusted to perform,4 as shown by the mixed results of liberalization efforts. These reforms 
typically liberalize some rules on professional conduct, such as prices and advertising, but keep 
the practice reserved for the professionals. Such partial liberalization may be inconsistent 
because licensing is now unnecessary for professionals to provide quality private services while 
freeing conduct makes it well nigh impossible for conveyancers to provide external effects. This 
is confirmed by the observed consequences of liberalization in the Netherlands, where most 
notaries’ prices were freed after 1999 and some freedom of entry allowed into each others’ 
reserved markets. The result was that cross subsidies were reduced, resulting in higher fees for 
family services and lower fees for high-price transactions (Kuijpers, Noailly and Vollaard, 
2005). Consistent with our argument, no change was detected in perceived quality by notary 
clients but the quality attributes controlled by the land register did decline (Nahuis and Noailly, 
2005), confirming that greater competition leads to weaker control of externalities. Casual 
evidence on Spain follows the same pattern after partial liberalization of entry in 1999 and of 
prices in 2000.  
These issues are important for transition and developing economies, where such mandatory 
intervention often increases transaction costs exorbitantly, as forcefully argued by Hernando de 
Soto (1989, 2000) and often reported in the news.5 As a consequence, it hinders the enforcement 
of property rights and the use of land as collateral for credit, a much-needed outcome.  
                                                 
3 See Section III and notes 15 and 20 below. This seems to follow a historical tendency, because 
notaries’ functions in common law were also wider in the past: see, for instance, Closen and 
Dixon (1992, p. 875, n. 10), on how US notaries prepared and kept copies of documents around 
1900; Pulling (1862, p. 10, n. u), on preparation of documents by 19
th century English notaries; 
and Brockman (1997), for the case of British Columbia. 
4 See Arruñada (2006) for an application of this argument to the professions in general.  
5 For example, authenticating documents for corporate loans entitled Hungarian notaries to 0.1% 
of the sum involved (“Your Papers Please,” The Economist, November 20, 1997). In another 
notorious example, Italian notaries intervened until 2006 in all sales of used cars, and their prices 
for real estate transactions are so high that parties often avoid them by the old and cumbersome 
technique of filing a simulated lawsuit, a primitive technique similar to the fine used in old 
England from the 12
th century until 1833 (Kolbert and Mackay, 1977, p. 241), in colonial 
Massachusetts (Konig, 1974, pp. 160-61) and even in biblical times (Ellickson and Thorland, 
1995, p. 385).  
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B.  A guide to changes in conveyancing 
Demand for conveyancing services has seen substantial changes, rooted in the development 
of land titling systems as well as in the radical transformations experienced over the last two 
centuries by parties, technology and transactions in the conveyancing market.  
At the institutional level, states have developed public titling systems which effectively make 
either property contracts or property rights public, reducing the threat that hidden property rights 
previously posed to acquirers and, consequently, most of the demand for conveyancing services 
that, to some extent, provided a substitute service, including the avoidance of title conflicts, the 
design of title guarantees and acting as title depositories. More recently, information 
technologies have provided an alternative technology—electronic notarization—that in essence 
allows parties to disintermediate professional authenticators of documents and avoid the need for 
a physical meeting to sign the contract.  
At the market level, the emergence of large firms in mortgage lending, real estate 
development and  property transaction mediation has reduced the comparative advantage of 
conveyancers because such large firms are in a good position to guarantee quality to their 
customers and to achieve economies of scale and lower costs in the preparation of contracts. A 
similar consequence has resulted from changes in the nature of transactions, which have become 
more standardized as a consequence of the development of mass markets and mandatory 
legislation, both of which reduce the demand for tailoring contracts to individual needs.   
These sets of changes and their consequences for conveyancing will be analyzed in the next 
two sections. The paper ends with a discussion of future tendencies and policy issues.  
II.  Changes in conveyancing driven by the evolution of 
titling systems 
A.  Property rights under privacy and publicity 
Rights on land and some other durables can be enforced as “property” or in rem rights, 
claimable against the asset itself and therefore valid against all persons. Contrary to contractual 
or personal rights, property rights “run with the land,” meaning that they survive unaltered 
through transactions dealing with other rights on the same land. For example, a mortgagee keeps 
her claim on the land even after the mortgagor sells it. Property rights also oblige all people: the  
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new owner who has purchased the land is obliged to respect both the mortgage and, in particular, 
the right to foreclose in case the guaranteed debt is not paid.6  
When the law enforces a right as a property right, consent of the right holder is required for 
the right to be damaged. This requirement of consent ensures enforcement because transactions 
among parties do not convey property rights with the promised in rem extent until all affected 
right holders have consented. However, such survival of property rights after conveying the land 
requires costly institutions and procedures in order to search, bargain and contract for the 
relevant consents. An obvious cost comes about because the possibility of hidden property rights 
increases the information asymmetry between the conveying parties: in the absence of consent 
from the hidden right holder, the acquired asset is burdened with the hidden right and the 
acquirer has instead a contractual right against the seller. More generally, the need to know 
which conflicting property rights exist, finding out who their right holders are, bargaining with 
such right holders to obtain their consent and formalizing an agreement with them, all increase 
the costs of conveying and transforming rights. 
Two main legal regimes have been applied for enforcing property rights: privacy and 
publicity.  
Under the tradition of private conveyance that was dominant in Europe until the 19
th century, 
earlier private contracts on land had in rem effects on later acquirers even if such contracts were 
kept secret. In cases of conflict, courts established title on the basis of evidence on possession 
and on past transactions (the “chain of title”), whether or not such transactions had remained 
hidden, and set priorities among claims according to their dates of contract. These two solutions 
did not, however, reduce transaction costs substantially. On the one hand, physical possession 
does not inform about abstract rights, like ownership and mortgages. When possession is used to 
establish ownership, specialization of ownership and control is hindered because it subjects 
owners to the risk that possessors might use their position to acquire ownership or convey 
owners’ rights. Similarly, using land as collateral for credit requires transferring ownership or 
                                                 
6 My previous work on notaries (Arruñada, 1996) was implicitly grounded on the concept of 
property rights most commonly used by economists, which does not distinguish between what in 
law are “property” (that is, in rem) and “contractual” (personal) rights. As a consequence, it 
disregards the incapacity of competing notaries to be independent of the parties and control 
legality because, typically, parties are free to choose notary. This incapacity worsens when 
prices are freely set by notaries. Even notaries who act impartially face substantial limitations in 
performing their function because they act in the interest of the parties, and controlling legality 
essentially means defending the interest of third parties. These limitations lie in the free choice 
of notary by the parties (so that effective standards are set by the professionals who control the 
least) and become more binding with increased competition. Conveyancers are motivated to 
prevent potential damage to the contractual parties, but only to the extent that effective control 
may be performed subsequently by judges (under recording) or it is performed immediately by 
registers (under registration). Arruñada (2003a), which is the basis for this section, clarifies this 
crucial distinction, one that is often overlooked (for instance, by Van den Bergh and Montangie, 
2006a and 2006b). It also reinforces the argument in Arruñada (1996) that the comparative 
advantage of notaries lies in the economies of scope reached by impartial lawyering, which is 
often artificially forbidden by the Bar in common law countries (see n. 21). For a comparison of 
titling systems from a public policy perspective, see Arruñada and Garoupa (2005).  
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possession to the lender, thus leaving the debtor subject to the lender’s moral hazard. On the 
other hand, some of these problems are overcome by embodying abstract rights in titles and 
evidencing rights with the chain of title, which makes it easier to separate ownership and control. 
Titles also serve to enforce securities, by depositing the titles with the lender, even if this burdens 
the debtor with the lender’s moral hazard and causes switching costs that make second 
mortgages difficult.  
The remaining difficulties of contracting property rights under privacy were such that 
modern systems of property law started to induce or require the publicity of contracts in land as a 
prerequisite for them to attain in rem effects. Under a system of publicity, right holders risk 
losing in rem effects if they keep their rights private. For example, a buyer may lose his land if 
the seller sells it again to an innocent third party who publicizes her acquisition first. That is, 
private contracts may create obligations among the parties (the buyer would have a claim against 
such a fraudulent seller) but do not bind third parties—in this case, the later, innocent buyer. 
Publicity therefore facilitates the search of which property rights are held by whom, making it 
possible to reach consent ex ante, purging titles, and reducing information asymmetries between 
transactors.  
Modern legal systems differ in the kind of publicity they provide. Systems of recordation of 
deeds (used in most of the US, part of Canada, France and some other countries) simply enroll 
and keep private contracts (“title deeds”) and thus provide evidence on property claims. This 
evidence is then used by judges to allocate property rights in case of litigation ex post. 
Furthermore, courts determine the priority of claims from the date of recording in the public 
office and not from the date of the contract. This “first in recording first in right” priority rule 
effectively motivates parties to record from fear of losing title through, for example, a wrongful 
second sale. It also makes it possible to produce information on the quality of title (“title 
reports”), by having an expert examine the public record of deeds and not merely—as under 
privacy—those deeds in the grantor’s chain of title. In fact, whole industries have developed to 
supply these title assurance services: notaries in, for example, France and abstractors, attorneys, 
title insurance agents and title insurance underwriters in the US.  
As in recordation of deeds, registration of rights also applies this priority rule:7 private 
contracts gain provisional priority when they are first lodged in the register. They are then 
subject, however, to substantive review by the registrar, to detect any potential conflict with 
other property rights. Rights are registered only when the registrar determines that they do not 
affect any other property right or the holders of affected rights have consented. Otherwise, 
registration is denied and the parties have to restructure their contract or obtain the relevant 
consents. For registered rights and given that any contradictions have been purged, the register is 
able to provide “conclusive,” “indefeasible” title, meaning that a good faith buyer acquires a 
property right if the purchase is based on the information provided by the register. 
                                                 
7 Registers of rights developed within the German legal tradition, during the 19th century 
(Prussia, 1783; Austria, 1794; Spain, 1861; Australia, 1875; Germany, 1900) and are now used 
in most of the world, including the Australian “Torrens” variety, adapted from the register of 
ships in Hamburg, which has been introduced in some other Common Law jurisdictions. It is 
also the system being introduced in most former Socialist and developing countries.  
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B.  Demand for conveyancing services in the three titling systems 
All three systems share functional similarities: all three are based on enforcing individual 
consent as a requirement. As a consequence, contracting proceeds in two steps: first, parties 
agree to the transaction; second, they gather the consent of affected right holders. By making this 
gathering of consent more or less difficult, the three titling systems induce different demands for 
“conveyancing services”, these being understood as services provided by notaries, lawyers or 
other professionals that support contracting between the parties.  
Privacy 
Under privacy, property rights would eventually be enforced in rem even if the transaction 
remained hidden. By themselves, private contracts could not damage third parties. For instance, 
if B2 is purchasing land from O, B2 should be worried that O might have previously sold the land 
to B1 or mortgaged the same land to L. However, B1 is fully protected because, assuming neither 
of the two buyers took possession, the courts will establish title according to the date of the 
contract and give the land to B1, with B2 having only a contractual claim on O. Buyer B1 should 
be worried, however, about the possibility that O and B2 may fraudulently antedate their contract.  
This system maximizes the complexity of conveyancing services. It first generates demand 
for lawyers to design and evaluate title guarantees offered by sellers and third parties, which, 
even if they do not protect buyers in rem, at least provide some protection in personam.  
Second, reducing transaction costs when rights are embodied in titles also requires protecting 
the titles against fraud.8 From early times, legal systems required the presence of witnesses, 
surely the simplest solution, often qualified in terms of number, age, expertise and authority. In 
addition, titles are protected by requiring that specialists (lawyers or notaries) are involved in 
producing them. A common solution to make fraud difficult is for grantees and mortgagees to 
demand delivery of the full chain of titles from grantors and mortgagors, so that the risk of 
previous competing transactions is reduced and later transactions will require faking a full chain 
of titles. In a sense, the chain of titles is used as a private record but without any guarantee that it 
is exhaustive.  
The role of conveyancers is greatest under the privacy system, because they act as both 
producers and depositories of the main body of evidence used to establish title. In this context, 
reducing competition between professionals serves two purposes.  
First, sharing information among conveyancers will substantially save on the costs of 
structuring new deals and make them more secure. This process could be observed recently in 
Andorra, a small independent country between France and Spain, which still applies a relatively 
pure system of Roman Law, including privacy for real estate transactions. The few Andorran 
notaries started to share information on mortgages after a new regulation was enacted in 1998.  
                                                 
8 The pervasiveness of compulsory proof and the ingenuity applied to developing it attests to the 
importance of restraining fraudulent conveyance. For historical references, see Arruñada (2003, 
p. 407).  
8
Second, reducing competition will lessen the incentives of conveyancers to cheat each other, 
and may provide some support for the protection of third parties against fraud. The system 
hinges, however, on  conveyancers dating deeds faithfully. For instance, notaries chronologically 
enter all documents into the notary’s protocol, which provides an additional safeguard on the 
dating of documents. But the system may be prone to fraud as can be seen in some Latin 
American countries where, given the sorry state of the land registers, judges tend to pay some 
attention to the date of deeds, falling back de facto into a privacy system and thus increasing the 
motivation to fraudulently antedate deed notarization, apparently a common occurrence. 
Recording 
Under recording, private contracts and other documents are filed in a public office that does 
not perform any control but for the date of the document and the formalities required to index it. 
The need to safeguard the contract is reduced with respect to privacy because this public control 
avoids one of the typical frauds under privacy—antedating a sale or a mortgage. The role of 
conveyancers as depositories of documents also becomes less relevant and tends to disappear. 
Something similar happens to the demand for writing sophisticated title guarantees, to the extent 
that the filing system makes them superfluous.  
Recording does not, however, avoid the risk of a second sale or mortgage. In the previous 
example, the recording office will not object to recording the second sale by O to B2, even if the 
first sale to B1 is already on record. Nor will it object to recording a sale to B2 free of charges 
even if a mortgage of the land to L has previously been recorded. Buyers will be aware that the 
apparent owner might have sold or mortgaged beforehand, and this deed might have been 
recorded and gained priority. Furthermore, finding the relevant information is not easy, because 
the public record contains a mix of relevant and irrelevant deeds resulting from all the previous 
transactions and the deeds are indexed on a personal basis, using name or grantor-grantee 
indexes.  
To avoid nasty surprises and report on the quality of title, parties will retain some sort of title 
agent to search the record fully and detect any previous sales or other title cloud. Consequently, 
the role of these title agents in searching and reporting on the quality of title remains important, 
creating a substantial demand for conveyancers.  
The importance of their function will be smaller, however, the better the organization of the 
recording office. Two innovations with respect to pure recording as described above are crucial: 
control by the recordation office that the grantor has good title and use of a tract index, both of 
which are applied, for example, in France but not in most of the US.   
First, the quality of the recorded information improves substantially when the recordation 
office requires that only those already recorded as right holders can be grantors in a new 
transaction, thus eliminating the risk of second sales. Similarly, a well-functioning recording 
office will control lender’s consent before canceling a mortgage.  
Second, the use of tract indexes, instead of relying on personal indexes of grantors and 
grantees, is essential for avoiding filing errors.  When the records are poorly organized (as in 
many US counties), it seems natural to develop private “title plants,” that is, well-organized 
replicas of the public records. The investment required to build such plants will move the  
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comparative advantage from individual title agents to the operators of the plants, who then play 
the leading role in the whole process.  
Registration 
Under registration, the register controls not only the date but also the content of the private 
contract and any potential collision with property rights held by third parties, which drastically 
diminishes the demand for high-value services in the preparation of the private contract. There is 
no role for title guarantees, and the register itself performs the title search and produces a title 
certificate.  
Moreover, the switch from property to liability rule—that is, the fact that, under registration, 
an innocent purchaser who relied on the register keeps the land to the detriment of the “true” 
legal owner—means that notaries are no longer indirectly motivated by the interest of their 
clients to identify and avoid potential title defects (as they are under privacy and recording). 
Notaries tend, rather, to become the advocates of the parties to the register, which is now the 
main instance protecting the interest of third parties, whose property rights would become 
contractual rights in case of registration error. In other words, given that under registration courts 
adjudicate conflicting rights by applying a rule of liability, parties tend to encourage 
conveyancers and title examiners to disguise the facts before the register instead of preventing 
such title conflicts, a change that further reduces the former gatekeeping function of these 
professionals.  
Understandably, the demand for conveyancers to authenticate contracts also diminishes, for 
several reasons. First, registers are well placed to authenticate documents by themselves. In 
contrast to mere recording offices, registers perform a highly technical task when controlling the 
legality of private contracts. The knowledge and safeguards necessary to perform such a task can 
easily be applied to a relatively less technical task such as authentication. This is shown 
empirically by the existence and effectiveness of registers of rights in Scandinavian countries, 
which require neither notarized deeds nor intervention by lawyers but simply rely on witnesses. 
Second, banks are now the real experts in identifying individuals, and this also diminishes the 
role of lawyers and notaries in contracts to which banks are parties. Third, the development of 
digital authentication (often called electronic notarization) allows parties to disintermediate the 
notary and dispense with witnesses for authenticating purposes. This may even be more effective 
than traditional methods, now that urban lawyers and notaries do not personally know most of 
the parties, as they did in the past, and have to rely on indirect proof such as ID cards. (This lack 
of personal knowledge also hinders professionals’ ability to evaluate the parties’ mental 
capacity.)   
Nor is it necessary for lawyers to be involved in the start-up stages of a registration system. 
Given that start-up costs are high, if a reliable supply of high-quality conveyancing services is 
available, a way of saving on start-up costs could be to make use of conveyancers to purge titles 
and improve the quality of deeds, as claimed by solicitors in the transition between titling 
systems in Ontario.9 However, provisional registration of possessory rights provides an 
                                                 
9 Troister and Waters (1996).   
10
alternative, cheaper and probably equally effective solution.10 Furthermore, reliance on 
conveyancers for the start-up stage poses the obvious risk that this mandatory intervention may 
extend beyond their useful life, as a  functional, steady-state register clears titles on registered 
land effectively and at low cost without such intervention.  
This shrinking of conveyancing under registration helps to explain why conveyancers often 
oppose registration. Indeed, conveyancers have often managed to impede the development of 
registers, monopolizing entry into existing registers or debasing their legal effects—for instance, 
by reinforcing the effects of possession or title deeds against those of the register.11 Partly as a 
consequence of this, many real systems are hybrids in transition (Arruñada, 2003). In particular, 
registration systems are often plagued by the presence of “overriding interests”: rights which are 
enforced in rem despite not being registered (for instance, due taxes and possessory rights) or 
rights filed in separate administrative registers (as typically happens with municipalities’ zoning 
and preemption rights). This implies that in many countries the role of conveyancers is also a 
hybrid one, playing a greater role with respect to unregistered rights. For example, French 
notaries play a preventive role, similar to that of US title insurers with respect to the preemption 
rights held by tenants and municipalities (Willman and Pillebout, 2002), but very different with 
respect to ownership rights, because the French recording office checks that the grantor has good 
title, in application of the règle de l’effet relatif. 
Evidence on the substitution between registration and conveyancing 
One of the previous claims is amenable to empirical testing: the reduction that registration 
causes in the scope of conveyancing services, which can be observed by comparing the 
transactions costs of property transactions in countries with different titling systems. As shown in 
Table 1, in countries with recording of deeds, conveyancing services for typical purchase and 
mortgage transactions are much more costly than in countries with registration of rights. In the 
five countries with registration of rights, the cost of conveyancers is only 0.36% of the value of 
the property for contracting a purchase and 0.14% for a mortgage, while in the four countries 
with recording of deeds, the costs are more than five and eight times higher, reaching 1.9% and 
1.13%, respectively.12 
                                                 
10 The case of Spain is analyzed in Arruñada (2003b). 
11 For example, it has been argued that one of the reasons why Torrens registration failed in the 
US was the opposition of lawyers, abstracters and title insurers (for example, Bostick, 1987, p. 
64, n. 23, citing Quintin Johnstone; Dukeminier and Krier, 1998, p. 721). Similarly, English 
solicitors stopped registration in the 19
th century (Anderson, 1992) and finally delayed its 
expansion for a century by requiring county votes (Bostick, 1987, p. 59, n. 7). Notaries’ 
resistance to change has often also been linked to their monopoly. See, for example, the cases of 
France in Suleiman (1987, pp. 92-106), Belgium in Raucent (1998, p. 129) and Spain in 
Arruñada (2001). 
12 Schmid et al. (2006) find that systems that are supposedly highly regulated (Germany, Spain) 
exhibit low legal costs. This finding is surprising only within their framework because they 
classify conveyancing systems according to a formal feature—intervention by different kinds of 
conveyancers (notaries, lawyers, real estate agents)—instead of the more substantive issue of the  
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These differences in the prices of conveyancing are consistent with two complementary 
interpretations. First, registration drastically reduces the value added by conveyancers. Second, 
in countries with recording of deeds, conveyancers have been successful in both impeding the 
introduction of the most efficient technology (registration) and in rent-seeking, therefore 
enjoying higher prices. The efficiency of registration is supported by the fact that it reduces the 
cost and value of conveyancing without increasing the cost of public titling. On the contrary, the 
data shows that the costs of registers under registration of rights are lower (0.1% for purchases 
and 0.22% for mortgages) than those of recorders under recordation of deeds (0.9% and 0.23%, 
respectively). If confirmed, this cost advantage of registration would make the theoretical 
comparison in Arruñada and Garoupa (2005) far more favorable to registration, at least in a 
steady state scenario which does not consider the costs of initial registration. It also clarifies the 
options faced by policy makers when reforming these systems. 
III.  Changes in conveyancing driven by changes in parties 
and transactions 
In parallel with the development of titling systems, the characteristics of parties and 
transactions have changed substantially, dramatically reducing the comparative advantage of 
conveyancers for helping parties to property contracts.  
The professional structures of the conveyancing industries were set up in the 19
th century, at 
a time when most contracting took place between relatively equal, small parties, mostly 
individuals, who were free to contract according to their wishes in the shadow of default law. 
These features of party equality and contractual freedom have changed substantially since then, 
altering the kind of conveyancing support services needed and making it possible to provide 
them more cheaply.  
This section will show that the growing dominance of large parties has reduced the 
importance of information asymmetries between parties to the private contract and the locus of 
economies of scale in contract preparation. The standardization and mandatory regulation of 
transactions has lessened the demand for tailoring private contracts to the parties’ specific 
circumstances.   
                                                                                                                                                             
type of land register existing in each country, which defines by default the function actually 
performed by conveyancers, whether they are called lawyers, notaries or estate agents. For the 
same reason, their consideration of the Netherlands as a unique system is widely off the mark, 
especially considering the limitations of the Dutch liberalization process.   
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A. Parties’  characteristics 
Today, in a large number of property contracts, at least one of the parties is a firm playing 
repeatedly in the market, mainly lenders, property developers and real estate agents. The size and 
continuous presence of these firms in the market makes it possible for them to reach economies 
of scale in the preparation and safeguarding of contracts, reducing the demand for professional 
conveyancers.  
In practice, therefore, many property contracts have become contracts of adhesion. This is 
especially the case for mortgage deeds, most of which are now written by lenders or, in the US, 
by secondary mortgagee lenders (DOJ, 1999, p. 7), and filled in with the help of specialized 
software packages.13 This transformation into contracts of adhesion may cause new problems, 
which cannot be properly discussed in this paper,14 but, whatever the seriousness of these 
problems, such transformation minimizes the role of professional conveyancers in drafting the 
contract.15 
Similarly, because of their repeated presence in the market, large parties have additional 
incentives to invest in reputation and to act fairly. They are therefore in a good position to be 
impartial within specific transactions,16 exerting contractual and even quasi-judicial tasks.17 In 
                                                 
13 For many years firms such as International Document Services (http://www.idsdoc.com, 
visited July 1, 2004) have been providing online software that serves to prepare mortgage forms 
that are updated regularly to comply with the requirements of secondary lenders (see, for 
example, “Partnership links doc prep and RE,” Origination News, 8 (5), 13, February 1999).  
14 It has been argued, for instance that adhesion contracts pose a typical “lemons problem” 
(Katz, 1990), but competition will motivate drafting firms to invent communication 
arrangements that make it profitable to improve the clauses in such contracts efficiently (that is, 
including actual information and the learning costs suffered by all parties). The same 
counterargument applies to the bounded rationality arguments made popular by Korobkin 
(2003), among others.  
15 This effect is often admitted by the professionals, who consider that it has debased their 
function. For instance, a prominent Spanish notary writes that “the massive granting of certain 
types of contract, specially deeds of sale and mortgage loans, as well as company incorporations 
and transformations, has had a dual effect: on the one hand, it has deprived the Notary of an 
essential part of his function, the writing of the document, which is invariably granted on the 
basis of a draft produced by the legal services of the granting organization; on the other, it limits 
participation by the Notary, throughout the ‘transaction path,’ to the single moment of 
authorizing the deed” (López Burniol, 1994, p. 129). See also note 20. 
16 Reaching this position of impartiality requires effectively solving the agency problem within 
firms: for example, providing powerful short-term incentives to employees will often motivate 
them to exploit customers even when this is detrimental to the firm. In a competitive 
environment, the incentives are present, however, for firms to trade off the different contractual 
problems with customers and employees, choosing the right mix of safeguards.  
17 On this “asymmetric contracting”, see Arruñada (2000), and Arruñada, Garicano and Vázquez 
(2001).   
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fact, the contractual functions of these agents go further than the preparation of documents. 
Consider, for instance, the procedures for non-judicial foreclosure of mortgages in the US, the 
traditional functioning of US banks as notaries,18 or the unilateral setting of the final debt by 
lenders within the foreclosure procedure in Spain. Participation by reputed parties therefore 
diminishes the role of lawyers in both the preparation and safeguarding of all but the highest-
value contracts.19  
Furthermore, the arrival of large, reputed parties entails a basic change in the way 
transactions are safeguarded against opportunism. Traditionally, conflicts of interests in 
conveyancing were overcome by relying on adversary lawyering in common law and notaries’ 
impartiality in civil law. The presence of large, reputed parties substantially modifies both 
arrangements. First, because such parties provide assurance by themselves. Second, because their 
volume endangers the impartiality of notaries who, consequently, often add little to the safeguard 
provided by the reputation of such large parties.20 In some countries, a tendency is observed 
towards the presence of large parties as ultimate assurers and the increasing role of lawyers as 
impartial representatives of several parties.21 
                                                 
18 Understandably, a US bank was the pioneer in providing digital signatures, as “banks’ capital 
strength, fiduciary tradition, and long involvement with electronic services and data base 
management create a natural affinity for providing electronic authentication services” (Corwin, 
1998).  
19 On the historic role of notaries in overcoming information asymmetries, see Hoffmann, 
Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal (1998, 2000).  
20 Prominent notaries also acknowledge this dependence “in all those very numerous cases in 
which the deeds are written up in accordance with drafts ‘imposed’ by one of the parties—
generally, a large financial institution—, constituting authentic contracts of adhesion” (López 
Burniol, 1994, p. 142). Other notaries complain that they cannot “change a single comma in the 
clauses” of mortgage deeds (Berná and Crehuet, 2001). On the role of impartiality in the position 
of notaries, see Arruñada (1996, pp. 9-10) and Malavet (1996). Impartial intervention had not 
always been achieved by notaries, however, as shown by the common practice in some 
countries, where each party retains her own notary, such as in France (Paterson, Fink, and Ogus, 
2003, p. 208) and British Columbia (Strandlund, 2000). 
21 On the possibilities and restrictions faced by US lawyers to act as impartial agents, 
representing not one but several parties, see Hazard (1978, pp. 56-68), Dzienkowski (1992) and 
rule 2.2 of the ABA code of professional conduct (2001), as well as an early analysis of the 
impartial role of some escrow agents in Burke and Fox (1976, pp. 333-345). English solicitors 
face similar restraints to represent several parties in a conveyance as a consequence of Rule 6 of 
the Law Society Practice Rules (1990), but with some exceptions, which require parties’ 
consent, lack of conflict of interest and that the seller is not selling as a builder. There is no 
conflict of interest in acting for co-sellers, for co-purchasers, for the seller and seller’s 
mortgagee, or for the purchaser and the purchaser’s mortgagee, if the mortgagee is not a private 
person (Sarton, 2000, pp. 23-24). The rule was strengthened in October 1999 and additional 
rules were introduced at the same time by The Lenders’ Handbook, a voluntary code of conduct 
adopted by the association of mortgage lenders to reduce conflicts of interest and instructing 
conveyancers acting on lenders’ behalf in residential conveyances. An updated version is 
available at www.cml.org.uk/handbook (accessed December 29, 2006).   
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Lastly, the comparative advantage of these large parties lies in their position as sellers of the 
fundamental services or goods that are the object of the contract (mortgage finance for lenders, 
mediation for real estate agents and buildings for land developers). Law professionals, alone or 
in partnership, are badly placed to counterbalance this advantage because of their specialization 
in contractual assistance,22 an ancillary service to the fundamental transaction.23  
B. Transaction  characteristics 
Demographic change has also had an impact, as growing urbanization means that most 
transactions now deal with urban property, which is relatively more homogenous and presents 
fewer complications—for example, it is easy to identify and has fewer easements.   
Standardization also comes about because of the more mandatory nature that the law adopted 
during the 20
th century. In the 19
th century, the law provided a set of default rules to the parties, 
allowing them to tailor their contracts freely to their particular needs. Mandatory law, in contrast, 
obliges parties to contract using fixed terms. The phenomenon is widespread: consider, for 
instance, the mandatory nature of legislation on mortgage foreclosures in most US states.  
In some cases, the demand for legal services to support the contract changes in nature: 
instead of lawyers being required to tailor specific clauses, they are increasingly retained to 
comply with and circumvent mandatory rules. In this context, the relevance of civil law notaries 
has suffered more than that of other lawyers, as they often have little incentive to satisfy the 
demand for circumvention, because they enjoy a profitable monopoly, which was made more 
profitable by the lower costs brought about by standardization. They are, therefore, happy to 
provide compliance services, which add less value and can often be produced at lower cost by 
                                                 
22 French notaries are a remarkable exception as they are substantially involved in real estate 
agency. There are other cases on a smaller scale. In Spain, for instance, many notaries also 
provide and charge manual facilitation services for paying taxes and filing the deeds at the Land 
Register.   
23 The merger of commercial notaries (“corredores de comercio”) and standard civil notaries 
decreed by the Spanish government in 2000, provides some indirect evidence on the lack of 
comparative advantage of law professionals with respect to no-lawyers and large firms. Before 
the merger, commercial notaries enjoyed a monopoly in formalizing personal debt contracts 
while that of civil notaries mainly included mortgages and purchases of real estate. Some time 
after the merger, both types of notaries were allowed to notarize both sets of contracts. As a 
consequence, commercial notaries were soon notarizing as many real estate contracts as civil 
notaries, while civil notaries had achieved only a small share of personal debt contracts. In 2004, 
former commercial notaries already notarized an average of 2,092 civil contracts, not far from 
the 2,700 notarized by former civil notaries; the latter notarized only 755 personal credit 
contracts, far below the 2,574 of commercial notaries (data taken from the DGRN yearbook). 
This happened even though commercial notaries allegedly lacked proper legal training, which is 
consistent with our argument, as commercial notaries had stronger relationships with lenders and 
their entry into the civil notaries’ traditional market was facilitated by the fact that mortgage 
contracts are largely standardized, written and safeguarded by lenders.   
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paralegals, producing standardized clauses even when default law allows the parties to 
innovate.24  
Both phenomena are consistent with the statistical evolution of the mix of services provided 
by Spanish notaries and their productivity, shown in Table 2. During the 20th century, standard 
services such as mortgages grew more than those which require more individualized tailoring—
the estimated proportion of standardized documents rose from 38 to 62.5% between 1930 and 
1998. Consistently, the apparent productivity of notaries increased more than sixfold in terms of 
documents and almost tenfold in terms of sheets, a clear indication that theirs has become more 
an industrial and clerical activity than a truly professional one. Spanish notaries processed an 
average of 10.67 documents a day in 1998, while the standard number of deeds per notary in 
Berlin was only 325 documents a year (Kuijpers, Noailly and Vollaard, 2005, p. 61), about one 
per working day.25  
The diminishing role of law professionals in this field takes different forms in different 
jurisdictions. For instance, in many areas of the US, “attorneys are not normally involved in the 
home sale.26 For example, escrow agents or escrow companies in western states handle the 
paperwork to transfer title without any attorney involvement” (HUD, 2000, p. 2); in some states 
real estate agents act as dual agents of sellers and buyers (Pancak, Miceli and Sirmans, 1997). In 
residential transactions and with the exception of the 16 states in which attorneys still retain a 
monopoly over these services, it is usually the title insurance company which, through its own 
lay employees, searches the title, prepares the documents and closes the deal (ALTA, 2000). 
Something similar has happened in England, with the liberalization of conveyance after the 
Administration of Justice Act (1985), which created the profession of “licensed conveyancer”, 
and with the arrival of the so-called “factory conveyancing” offered by several large national law 
firms for lender clients. Everywhere, lawyers have opposed these changes on the grounds of 
preserving quality. Evidence on a drop of quality is lacking, however. For instance, Palomar 
(1999) finds that the incidence of failures is not greater in those US states where non-attorneys 
are allowed to prepare the deeds and close the deals.  
IV. Econometric  evidence 
The econometric analysis presented in Table 3 provides additional support for the claim that 
involvement in conveyancing by lawyers adds little value. To test this hypothesis, I use a cross 
                                                 
24 Paz-Ares (1995, p. 48, n. 84) tells how little variation was found in the 1990s within a sample 
of 500 articles of incorporation constraining the alienability of company shares. 
25 There are numerous accounts by notaries of this trivialization of their own work. For example, 
López Burniol (1994, pp. 113-149) and Berná and Crehuet (2001, especially pp. 119-122). In the 
same vein, from outside the profession, Paz-Ares (1995, pp. 48-49).  
26 On the activities of US competition authorities counseling against restraints on lay provision 
of closing services, see Schechter and Wilson (2006, pp. 575-576).  
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section of the average premiums paid for title insurance in the US, taken from Boackle (1997). 
The fact that more than 90% of the revenue collected by title insurers through these premiums is 
used to pay for their administration expenses, with only a small percentage covering insurance 
losses supports the interpretation of such premiums as a proxy for the cost of detecting potential 
title problems and, therefore, the quality provided by the conveyancing process in the long 
term.27  
Lawyers’ control of the market for preparing conveyancing documents is measured using 
two different independent variables. First, through the log of the number of different types of 
agent who are allowed to prepare documents in a given state, obtained from Boackle (1997). 
Second, through a dummy that takes value one for those states in which lawyers are required to 
prepare such documents; and takes value zero in all other states, taken from ALTA (2000).  
Controls are used for the amount of insurance coverage, measured in logs; a dummy for 
owners’ policies as opposed to lenders’ policies; a dummy for the inclusion of the cost of the title 
search and examination in the reported premium; a dummy for the inclusion of commitment fee 
in the premium; the minimum length of the title search in the state, measured in years; the 
number of years of occupancy in adverse possession with color of title or payment of taxes 
required to claim title in the particular state; an estimation of the fees for recording a transfer and 
a mortgage, in dollars; the market share of the five biggest title insurers in the state; and two 
dummies taking value one for states with unregulated pricing of title insurance policies and for 
those states with a “file and use” regulation (in the default regulatory regime prices are subject to 
“prior approval”, with one state under a “use and file” regime being computed as “file and use” 
and three states in which prices are promulgated being computed as “prior approval”). The use of 
most of the control variables is supported by their statistically significant correlations with the 
dependent variables, which show the expected signs.  
Table 3 reports several model specifications for the two relevant independent variables. 
Given that most independent variables take the same value for all observations in each state, 
errors are likely to be correlated within countries. Therefore, “robust” standard errors have been 
estimated using states as clusters. Boackle (1997) provides ten approximate prices for owners’ 
and lenders’ title insurance policies with five different amounts of coverage (50, 100, 200, 500 
and 1,000 thousand dollars) for 47 states and the District of Columbia, the four lowest amounts 
for Illinois, the three lowest for Indiana, and no data for Missouri (Iowa does not allow the sale 
of title insurance). In addition, data for some observations of the independent variables is 
missing. Equations (1) to (4) were obtained by deleting cases with some missing data while 
equations (5) to (8) use imputed values of missing observations (except for Iowa) obtained using 
the predictions from the best available subset of present data.  
Results for the two key independent variables do not support the view that intervention by 
lawyers provides better quality in the preparation of documents. On the contrary, greater freedom 
of entry in this activity, as measured by the different types of agent allowed to perform such 
tasks, is associated with lower insurance premiums while lawyers’ monopoly is associated with 
higher premiums. These results are statistically significant, considering the low number of 
observation clusters and the likelihood that the standard errors obtained in equations (3) and (4) 
are due to the missing data. The inclusion in the equations of control variables that proxy for the 
                                                 
27 On the economic nature of title insurance, see Arruñada (2002).  
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general quality of titles in each state (search length, years required for adverse possession and 
recording fees) makes it less likely that the results are driven by endogeneity or hidden variables 
related to state’s title quality.   
V. Concluding  remarks 
In essence, conveyancing services help parties to contract property, in rem, rights. Under the 
old system of private titling, such services used to include: gathering the consent of those third 
parties who might hold conflicting property rights on the same land, adapting the terms of 
exchange to the will of the parties in a way that solves their information asymmetry, and 
authenticating the contract. In all three of these functions, conveyancing involved substantial 
amounts of professional human capital and added considerable value as they all required legal 
and often local knowledge, as well as reputational capital.  
Both of these requirements have been substantially watered down. First, lawyers and notaries 
have been displaced in the task of detecting title conflicts with third parties by the development 
of registers of rights as well as by  improvements in recordation offices (in countries such as 
France) or the creation of additional, private “title plants” (as in the US), both of which apply 
some of the techniques of registration. Legal knowledge has also become less necessary for 
preparing each contract because contracts no longer need title guarantees, are increasingly 
standardized for mass transactions and mandatory law dictates many of their terms. Furthermore, 
large firms are in a position in which they can effectively safeguard transactions against 
information asymmetries without outside help. Finally, digital technology now has the potential 
to make traditional authentication methods obsolete.  
The private and social value of legal assistance in conveyancing services has therefore been 
declining. Regulation should be adapted accordingly, as both the information asymmetry and 
externality rationales for restrictive regulation hold less and less water over time, as a 
consequence of market and institutional changes. Moreover, regulation should be consistent with 
the reduced functions required of professionals. In particular, restrictive professional licensing is 
less justified to the extent that comparative advantage in the provision of externalities lies now in 
public registers and that of overcoming information asymmetries lies with large private firms. 
Regulation should also be consistent in preserving or, where needed, enhancing the effectiveness 
of public registers.  
For standard transactions, the horizon of regulation should be a sort of industrialized 
production of property rights with low costs and no defects. This Toyota-like manufacturing of 
property rights requires only a few changes in countries with properly-functioning registers: 
simplifying overriding interests, standardizing forms and allowing digital access to the registry. 
In this way, standard rights in real estate would end up being contracted as commodities, ideally 
in a way resembling financial derivatives, with much lower transaction costs than today.  
The role of law professionals in formalizing these standard transactions would be 
understandably small. Recent reforms and tendencies are moving in this direction, focusing the  
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use of lawyers only on those transactions for which they are really needed. In most of the US, 
lawyers do not intervene in residential transactions and mortgages. In most cases, title 
companies, through lay employees, search the title, prepare the documents and close the 
transaction. These tasks have been performed in England by licensed conveyancers since 1986. 
The fact that the US uses recording of deeds and England registration of rights shows that these 
changes are viable under both systems of public titling.  
Liberalization does not therefore entail the disappearance of participation by lawyers and 
notaries, but does require them to refocus their services. Law professionals are required to tailor 
the high-value transactions in which such tailoring is most valuable. They are also needed for 
exceptional cases of lower value, but in these they participate within an organized hierarchy that 
filters cases, matching their complexity with the human capital of the professionals handling 
them. Liberalization also encourages all sorts of providers to offer additional services, including 
a fuller guarantee—e.g. strict liability and no-fault errors and omissions insurance—and the 
gathering of additional information (for instance, on the physical quality of residential real estate 
and zoning restrictions, which is now underprovided in many countries).  Trends in countries that 
have been pioneers in liberalization indicate that there will also be a good deal of vertical 
integration, with competition amongst organizations that combine different mixes of legal, 
insurance, financial, distribution and mediation services in order to both reduce conflicts of 
interest and provide more valuable service to end users.    
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Table 1. Transaction costs of purchasing a home and taking out a mortgage to finance the purchase, as percentage of property value 
Countries with registration of rights  Countries with recording of deeds  Averages of  
countries with: 
 







Costs  related  to  a  house  purchase  :             
Solicitors’ / notary fees  0.5%  0.4%  0.5%  0.4% 0.0% 2.2% 1.2% 2.2% 2.0% 0.36%  1.9% 
Property  registration  0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.5% 3.0% 0.1% 0.9% 
Property  taxes  0.6% 1.0% 3.5% 7.5% 1.5% 12.5%  5.1% 9.0% 4.0% 2.82%  7.65% 
Other  purchase  costs  0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.04%  0.1% 
Total  purchase  cost  1.2% 1.6% 4.2% 8.0% 1.6% 14.7%  6.8% 11.7%  9.0% 3.32%  10.55% 
Costs  related  to  the  mortgage  loan:             
Property  valuation  0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.5% 0.08%  0.18% 
Solicitors’/  notary  fees  0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.0% 1.6% 0.9% 0.0% 2.0% 0.14%  1.13% 
Mortgage  registration  0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.8% 0.0% 0.1% 0.5% 0.3% 0.22%  0.23% 
Loan  taxes  1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.8% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.42%  0.23% 
Other  loan  costs  0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.16%  0.2% 
Total mortgage loan cost  2.1%  0.3%  0.3%  1.7% 0.8% 2.5% 1.0% 1.4% 2.8% 1.04%  1.93% 
Total legal cost  0.8% 0.5% 1.0% 1.0% 0.8% 3.8% 2.3% 3.2% 7.3% 0.82%  4.15% 
Total cost  3.3% 1.9% 4.5% 9.7% 2.4% 17.1% 7.8%  13.0% 11.8% 4.36% 12.43% 
Notes: Classification of titling systems and averages drawn up by the author from data collected by the European Mortgage Federation for typical homes and loans acquired in 
2004 by first-time buyers in each country (EMF, 2006, p. 20). Data available for Hungary and Poland is not included because of the nascent nature of their titling systems but 
including it does not substantially modify the results. World Bank’s Doing Business data is not comparable because it excludes the cost of professional services which are not 
legally mandatory even if they are widely used by contractual parties, who often have theoretical rather than real freedom not to retain such professionals. “Total legal cost” 
includes solicitors, notaries and registers.  
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Table 2. Average annual output per notary in Spain, in order of increasing rates of growth of 
different types of document between 1970 and 1998 




Documents related to marital status  2.46  5.13 2.85  108.63%  -44.32% 
Sales of farm property  305.15 334.06 298.60  9.47%  -10.62% 
Wills 78.46  160.62  243.47  104.72%  51.58% 
Contracts 163.30  512.48  783.77 213.82% 52.94% 
Inheritances 19.66  36.14  72.71  83.81%  101.19% 
Records 22.03  120.57  244.81  447.20%  103.05% 
Powers of attorney  77.32  242.49  510.67  213.61%  110.60% 
Sales of urban property  77.66 347.27 860.15 347.15%  147.69% 
Debt cancellations  22.80 47.82  220.07  109.76%  360.22% 
Mortgages 18.43  54.97  268.93 198.19%  389.25% 
Loans 24.81  53.95  324.13  117.46%  500.77% 
Corporate transactions  2.33 13.94  137.45  498.30%  885.83% 
Marriage contracts  3.61 0.87  21.16  -75.92%  2336.68% 
Percentage of standardized  documents        
   Unweighted    30.53%  30.00%  46.55%     
   Weighted  37.95% 32.13% 62.48%     
Apparent productivity of notaries (average number of 
documents and sheets notarized by each notary in a 
working day): 
      
   Documents    1.74  4.97  10.67  186.48%  114.50% 
   S h e e t s   9.33 38.62 91.47  313.73%  136.85% 
Notes: Loans, mortgages, debt cancellations, powers of attorney and corporate transactions are considered standard transactions. 
This probably underestimates the degree of standardization, mainly because transactions in urban real estate have become 
dominant and more standard, as they increasingly deal with apartments. Weights have been given in proportion to the estimated 
fee charged for each type of document. Productivity is measured considering 5 working days a week and 48 working weeks a 
year, and excluding protests. Source of data: DGRN (several years).  
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Table 3. Participation by lawyers in the preparation of conveyance documents and title insurance  
premiums across US states. Dependent variable: Log of state average title insurance premiums 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lawyers participation in the preparation of documents: 
        
Log of the types of agent allowed to prepare documents, including  -0.184
* -0.193
**    - 0 . 1 3 6
** -0.151
**    
lawyers, parties, title companies, lenders, etc. (Boackle, 1997, question 3)  (0.103)  (0.092)     (0.057) (0.060)    
Lawyers’ monopoly in preparation of documents;       0.063  0.046      0.190
** 0.193
** 
= 1, if monopoly; = 0, otherwise (Source: ALTA, 2000)      (0.080)  (0.078)      (0.087)  (0.095) 
C o n t r o l   v a r i a b l e s :           









(Source: Boackle, 1997, question 31)  (0.022)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 









(Source: Boackle, 1997, question 31)  (0.036)  (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) 









(Source: Boackle, 1997, question 35)  (0.125)  (0.099) (0.135) (0.120) (0.083) (0.082) (0.099) (0.094) 









(Source: Boackle, 1997, question 32)  (0.102)  (0.102) (0.104) (0.109) (0.097) (0.099) (0.099) (0.104) 









et al., 2002, p. 149)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years required for adverse possession with color of title or   -0.004    -0.008    -0.010
*   -0.011
*  
payment of taxes (Source: Jacobus, 1999, p. 98)  (0.007)    (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.006)   
Estimated recording fees for transfer and mortgage, in $   -0.001    0.001    0.002    0.003
*  
(Source: Boackle, 1997, questions 6 and 15)  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
State market share of top five title insurance firms   -0.007    -0.006    -0.009
* -0.010
* -0.009  -0.011
** 
(Source: Nyce & Boyer, 1998, Appendix D, column C)  (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Unregulated  pricing  of  title  insurance  -0.049   -0.065   0.012   0.007   
(Source: Nyce & Boyer, 1998, Appendix D, column E)  (0.112)    (0.105)    (0.077)    (0.073)   
“File and use” regulation of title insurance prices 0.003    -0.037   0.007   -0.034   










  (0.762) (0.307) (0.730) (0.293) (0.552) (0.510) (0.527) (0.494) 
Observations  340 340 340 340 500 500 500 500 
Clusters  34 34 34 34 50 50 50 50 
R-squared  0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.89 
Notes: OLS regressions, observations clustered into states. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models (5) to (8) use imputed values for 16 observations of fees (3.20%),  
40 of search time (8.00%) and 120 of commitment fees (24.00%). 
* Significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%.    
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VII. Annex 
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the econometric model 
 
Variable Observations  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Log  of  premiums  484  6.579234 .9451496 3.912023 8.83142 
Lawyers’  monopoly  510  .3137255 .4644618 0  1 
Log of types of allowed preparers  510  .5923906  .5590429  0  2.70805 
Log  of  coverage    510  12.29669 1.076824 10.81978 13.81551 
Owner’s policy   510  .5  .5004909  0  1 
Fees include search   510  .4313725  .4957542  0  1 
Commitment fees   380  .6052632  .4894385  0  1 
Search  length  470  86.82979 57.08831 30  187 
Years for adverse possession  510  11.26471  5.412596  3  25 
Recording fees   510  54.61765  23.37017  18  124 
Market share 5 top firms  510  86.61176  7.920842  72.6  100 
Unregulated pricing  500  .22  .4146612  0  1 
“File and use” regulation of prices  500  .24  .4275109  0  1 
 
 